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BLURRING THE LINE: IMPACT OF
OFFENSE-SPECIFIC SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Texas v. Cobb,' the Supreme Court held that the right to coun-
sel as provided for in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution 2 attaches only to charged offenses, and there is no exception
for crimes that are uncharged, yet "factually related" to a charged of-
fense.3 In a 5-4 decision, the Court reasoned that a suspect's Consti-
tutional rights do not override the government's interests in being
able to investigate related crimes,4 and that the suspect's rights are
sufficiently protected by reading him his Miranda warnings.' In ad-
dition, the Court held that the test set out in Blockburger v. United
States6 should be applied to determine whether offenses should be
considered the same offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.7
Generally, the Blockburger test states that if a different fact is needed
to prove the offenses, then they cannot be considered the same of-
fense.8
This Note argues that although the decision in Cobb follows past
Supreme Court decisions,9 the Court failed to recognize the impact
532 U.S. 162 (2001).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 167. Courts that have examined this exception use the terms "inex-
tricably intertwined," "closely related," and "factually related" interchangeably. See
Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1223 n.5 (Mass. 1997).
4 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 171-72.
5 Id. at 171.
6 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
7 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173.
8 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
9 See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1991) (holding Sixth Amend-
ment right attached only to the charged offense, and the Fifth Amendment right is not auto-
matically invoked for that offense).
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this decision would have in obliterating the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel."° Further, this Note examines issues raised by the dissent
that could have potentially impacted the Court's decision or that may
have implications in the future." In addition, this Note considers that
the Court imposed the rule with a purpose of increasing the ease of
applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, instead of choosing a
standard with exceptions that would ensure fairness and protection of
the accused's rights.'2
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY AND PURPOSE BEHIND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right to counsel has arisen out of two different Constitu-
tional Amendments. 3 The right is explicitly stated in the Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defense."' 4 In addition, the right has arisen from case law
interpreting the provision in the Fifth Amendment which states, "No
person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."' 5
From the beginning of the cases discussing the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, there has been a tension between protecting the
accused's Constitutional rights and allowing the authorities the lee-
way they need to investigate crimes.'6 Throughout much of the his-
tory of the right to counsel jurisprudence, the majorities generally ex-
panded the scope of the right to counsel to protect the rights of the
accused.' 7 However, beginning in 1988, the focus of the Supreme
Court switched from protecting the interests of the accused to facili-
tating the government's interest in investigating crimes through con-
versations with the suspect. 8
'0 See infra Part VI.
II1d.
12 Id.
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. Vi.
"4 U.S. CONST. amend. Vi.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
16 See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 179-80 (1985) (stating that the police have
an interest in investigating crimes, but that interest is limited by the rights of the accused).
17 See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (stating a suspect's waiver of
the right to counsel is not valid when the police initiate the conversations).
18 Compare Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), with Michigan v. Jackson, 475
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The history of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can be
traced back to Massiah v. United States, which was decided in
1964.9 In that case, the petitioner and a co-defendant were charged
with possession of narcotics aboard a United States vessel."0 After
being charged, the co-defendant agreed to cooperate with govern-
ment agents and allowed a conversation with the petitioner to be
monitored.2 During this conversation, the petitioner made incrimi-
nating statements that were admitted in the petitioner's trial, resulting
in his conviction.22 The Court held that allowing those statements
was a violation of the Sixth Amendment and that the statements
should have been suppressed.23 However, even at this early date, the
dissenters were urging that the right to counsel had extended too far,
since the accused was never denied access to counsel.24
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided the most significant
case to discuss the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, Miranda v.
Arizona.25 In doing so, the Court held that statements obtained from
defendants who were not fully warned of their Constitutional rights
were not admissible because they violated the Fifth Amendment right
to be free from compelled self-incrimination. 26 The overriding pol-
icy behind this decision was to respect the dignity and integrity of
United States citizens.27 As a consequence, if a defendant indicates to
investigators that he would like to speak to an attorney, the question-
ing must then stop, and the defendant can refrain from answering any
more questions without an attorney being present.28
The next important case discussing the Sixth Amendment right
U.S. 625 (1986). In the years between Jackson and Patterson, the composition of the Court
changed, with Justices Kennedy and Scalia replacing Chief Justice Burger and Justice Pow-
ell. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, members of the dissent in Jackson, gained the new
majority in Patterson with the addition of the recently appointed Justices Kennedy and
Scalia, and also Justice White, who had been a member of the majority in Jackson.
19 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
20 Id. at 202.
21 Id. at 202-03.
22 Id. at 203.
23 Id. at 205-06.
24 Id. at 209.
25 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26 Id. at 444.
27 Id. at 460.
28 Id. at 444-45.
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to counsel was Brewer v. Williams29 in 1977. In Brewer, the defen-
dant was charged with abducting a child, who was still missing at the
time of his arrest.3 ° After his arrest and arraignment, the defendant
was represented by counsel in both Davenport and Des Moines,
Iowa.31 While the defendant was being transported from Davenport
to Des Moines, unaccompanied by an attorney, one of the police offi-
cers continually made remarks regarding the right of the parents to
have a Christian burial for the child.32 Because of these remarks, the
deeply religious defendant33 eventually made incriminating state-
ments and led the police officers to the girl's body.34
Relying on Massiah, the Supreme Court stated that Williams was
entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 5 However, the issue
was whether Williams voluntarily waived this right to counsel.36
When the state court decided that Williams had waived this right, it
relied on the length of time of the trip, the general circumstances, and
the fact that Williams did not assert a desire not to speak without
counsel. 7 However, the Supreme Court found that the supposed
waiver was not an intentional relinquishment of his right to counsel
and granted him a new trial.3 The Court, however, declined to hold
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel could not be waived, only
that it had not been waived in this situation.39
Brewer was controversial, eliciting a concurrence and two sepa-
rate dissents. Chief Justice Burger authored the most significant dis-
sent and stated that, although following Massiah would suppress all
evidence obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment, a blanket ex-
29 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
30 Id. at 390.
31 Id. at 391.
32 Id. at 392-93. The officer also stressed the fact that the weather was poor, and the
chances of finding the girl's body after more snow had fallen would decrease significantly.
Id.
33 Id. at 403.
34 Id. at 393. In allowing the incriminating statements to be presented at trial, the state
court assumed that this "Christian burial speech" constituted an interrogation. 1d. at 400.
35 Id. at 401.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 404-06. The Court based its decision on the fact that Williams consulted two
different attorneys and told the detective during the car ride that he would tell the whole
story after speaking to his attorney. Id.
39 Id. at 405-06.
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clusionary rule should not be adopted.4" Evidence should only be
suppressed when the conduct of the police officers is so egregious
that use of the evidence would "imperil the values [of] the Amend-
ment."41 Justice White's separate dissent also stated that excluding
the testimony in this case expanded the Sixth Amendment too
broadly.4 2
The next case dealing with the right to counsel was Edwards v.
Arizona-however, this case dealt with the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel.43  The Court said that in order for a suspect to waive his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the waiver must be a "knowing
and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege, ' 44 and the defendant must be the one to initiate the conver-
sation or exchange with the police. 4
Although there were no dissents in Edwards, the concurring jus-
tices would not put such stringent requirements on waiver in different
factual scenarios.46 Chief Justice Burger stated that the dispositive
fact in this case was that the police told the suspect he "had" to speak
with the officers, and therefore his waiver was not voluntary. 47 How-
ever, Chief Justice Burger also stated that the determination of a
valid, voluntary waiver depends on the facts and circumstances of
each individual case, "'including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused."' 48  Justice Powell, with whom Justice
Rehnquist joined concurring, stated he would not impose the re-
quirement that contact be initiated by the accused in order to waive
the right to counsel.49
The Supreme Court next addressed an issue that dealt with the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in 1985.50 The specific issue in
Maine v. Moulton was whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
40 Id. at 425-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 420-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 437-38 (White, J., dissenting).
43 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
44 Id. at 482.
45 Id. at 485.
46 See id. at 487 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("I do not agree that either any constitutional
standard ... calls for a special rule as to how an accused in custody may waive the right to
be free from interrogation."); see id. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating initiation could
be relevant, but should not be the sine qua non).
47 Id. at 488 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
48 id. (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
49 Id. at 489-90 (Powell, J., concurring).
50 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
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was violated when statements made by the defendant to a co-
defendant, who was cooperating with the police, were admitted at
trial.5" The Court held that the State violated the Sixth Amendment
by "knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel
present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent.,
52
The incriminating statements obtained in this manner should not have
been allowed into evidence. 3 In the opinion, however, the Court al-
luded to the offense-specific nature of the right to counsel by stating
that the statements could be admitted in a prosecution for charges for
which the adversary proceedings had not yet begun, but they could
not be admitted in the trial for crimes that the defendant had already
been charged with.54
This case also marked some of the strongest language in support
of the policy behind the right to counsel.55 The Court stated that the
average criminal does not have the professional legal skills to protect
himself,56 and therefore the right to counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment is "indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial
system of criminal justice."57 The state thus has an affirmative obli-
gation to respect the accused's choice to have counsel, 8 but the Sixth
Amendment is not violated when the State obtains a confession by
luck or coincidence.5 9 In addition, the State's interest in gathering in-
formation should not be frustrated by the attachment of the Sixth
Amendment when the defendant has not yet been charged.6 °
The dissent was authored by Chief Justice Burger, and joined by
Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor in part,6' who are essen-
tially the majority in Cobb.62 They would impose a standard that, if
there was a legitimate reason for the questioning of the defendant,
then there would be no Sixth Amendment violation.63 They also
51 Id. at 161.
52 Id. at 176.
53 Id. at 168.
54 Id. (citing State v. Moulton, 481 A.2d 155, 161 (Me. 1984)).
55 See id. at 168-69.
56 Id. at 169 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938)).
57 Id. at 168-69.
58 Id. at 171.
59 Id. at 176.
60 Id. at 180.
61 Id. at 181 (Burger, CI., dissenting).
62 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 163 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the majority,
joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
63 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 185 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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stated that they did not want the Sixth Amendment to unnecessarily
protect criminals who are charged with multiple offenses,64 and they
did not want to broaden the right to counsel any more than it was un-
der Massiah.65
The very next year, the Court applied the doctrine regarding
waiver from Edwards to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,66
stating that the Sixth Amendment right deserved as much protection
as the right under the Fifth Amendment.67 In Michigan v. Jackson,
the Court decided that a defendant cannot waive his right to counsel
under the Sixth Amendment when the police initiate the conversa-
tion." In Jackson, the defendants had requested counsel at their ar-
raignments, but the police initiated contact with them again before
they were allowed to speak with their counsel.69 The Court stated
that as soon as the right to counsel attaches, counsel is assumed to be
requested for every stage of the litigation.7" Since the right to counsel
attached at their arraignments,71 the defendants could not have
waived their Sixth Amendment right to counsel during any subse-
quent police-initiated interrogations.7" The decision implies, how-
ever, that the defendant must affirmatively make a request for coun-
sel at some point and not merely allow the right to counsel to attach
to the offense.73
Again, the same Justices who dissented in Moulton joined in a
dissent that stated Edwards should not be applied to cases under the
Sixth Amendment, absent evidence that police officers routinely vio-
late the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.74 The dissent also states
that the holding is only limited to situations where the defendant as-
serts his right to counsel, not situations where the right simply at-
taches without an assertion.75 However, unlike the Fifth Amendment,
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not depend on an invoca-
64 See id. at 186.
65 See id. at 190.
66 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
67 Id. at 631.
68 Id. at 636.
69 Id. at 627-28.
70 Id. at 632-33.
71 Id. at 628.
72 Id. at 636.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 639 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 640.
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tion by the defendant in order to attach.76
The decision in Patterson v. Illinois in 1988 marked a shift from
the Court's expansion of the right to counsel to the contraction of that
right.77 The dissenters who had been arguing for years to limit the
right to counsel finally gained a majority.78 The majority in Patter-
son stated that the petitioner had never asserted his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel after his indictment.79 That lack of assertion implied
he made the decision not to be represented by counsel, and the state-
ments he made to the police could be admitted at trial.8" Again, this
is seemingly contrary to the idea in Brewer that the Sixth Amend-
ment right attaches without an invocation by the accused.8 The peti-
tioner argued that he did not waive his right to counsel, but the Court
said that the Miranda warnings were sufficient to alert the petitioner
of his rights, and therefore the waiver was valid."
The dissents in this case, which had formerly been the majority,
addressed three issues that would arise again in Cobb.83 They first
stated that since it is unethical for an attorney to contact the adver-
sary's client without counsel in civil proceedings, the same rule
should be applied in criminal proceedings.84 They also stated that
while the majority assumes that the Miranda warnings were suffi-
cient to warn the defendant of the danger of proceeding without
counsel, there are many things that an attorney can do for a client
above advising him to remain silent, of which the defendant may not
be aware.85 Further, the dissent stated that the adverse party cannot
ethically provide the accused with advice, particularly related to
whether or not the accused should have counsel present.86
The contraction of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel contin-
76 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
77 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
78 See supra note 18.
79 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 290-91.
80 Id. at 291.
81 See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404.
82 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 293.
83 See id. at 301-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 301 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2
(1984) ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the mat-
ter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.").
85 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 307-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 309-10.
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ued in McNeil v. Wisconsin.87 The issue presented to the Court in that
case was whether the defendant's request for counsel on a charged
offense under the Sixth Amendment establishes an invocation of his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, thus preventing police-initiated
interrogation on unrelated and uncharged offenses." The Court held
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached only with re-
spect to the charged offense, and the Fifth Amendment right had not
automatically been invoked for the other offenses.89 Therefore, in-
criminating statements made about other uncharged crimes are ad-
missible at the trial of those offenses.9" The Court also stated that the
purpose behind the Sixth Amendment is to "'protec[t] the unaided
layman at critical confrontations with his expert adversary,' the
government, after 'the adverse positions of government and
defendant have solidified' with respect to a particular alleged
crime."91
B. LOWER COURT EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The decision in McNeil laid the foundation for the decision made
in Cobb. However, in the years between McNeil and Cobb, several
federal appellate courts created exceptions to the offense-specific na-
ture of the right to counsel.92 The two most common exceptions are
that the uncharged offense was "inextricably intertwined" with the
charged offense such that the right to counsel should have attached to
both crimes,93 and that the government had circumvented the right to
counsel by interrogating the defendants without counsel present.94
The first exception arose out of Brewer where the Court implic-
itly used it in order to suppress statements regarding a murder when
the defendant had only been charged with an abduction.95 However,
87 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
88 Id. at 175.
89 See id. at 175-77. In fact, the Court expressly refrained from stating that an assertion
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel necessarily implies an assertion of the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 180.
90 Id. at 175-76.
91 Id. at 177-78 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37 (3d Cir. 1997);
United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d
451 (5th Cir. 1993); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218 (Mass. 1997); In re
Pack, 616 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
93 Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223.
94 Id.
95 See Brewer v.Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See also Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1224.
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deciding when to apply the exception was highly factualized, depend-
ing on the circumstances relating to the conduct involved, the identity
of the persons involved and the timing, motive, and location of the
crimes.96
The second exception, commonly termed "circumventing the
Sixth Amendment," has also been considered in courts of appeals
cases.97 The "circumventing the Sixth Amendment" exception ap-
plies when there is "evidence of deliberate police misconduct in the
process of eliciting the incriminating statements."98  Many courts
have not had the occasion to consider this exception, however, since
they have relied primarily on the "closely related" exception.99
C. THE DEFINITION OF "OFFENSE"
The Supreme Court had its first opportunity, in Cobb, to consider
what constitutes an "offense" for the purposes of right to counsel."0
The Supreme Court had considered this issue in terms of double
jeopardy, but not the right to counsel."°' In the double jeopardy con-
text, the Court applies the test from Blockburger v. United States,
which states, "where the same act or transaction constitutes a viola-
tion of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied ... is
whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not." ' 2 In Blockburger, the Court found that although there was only
one transaction (a drug sale), that sale constituted a violation of two
statutory sections and, therefore, there were two offenses.' 3
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In December 1993, while Lindsey Owings was at work, his
home was burglarized and his wife Margaret and 16-month-old
daughter Kori Rae disappeared.0 4 Based on an anonymous tip, the
police questioned Raymond Levi Cobb, who lived across the street
96 Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225.
97 See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Marti-
nez, 972 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1992).
98 Arnold, 106 F.3d at 41.
99 See, e.g., Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223.
10o Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 173 (2001).
101 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
102 Id. at 304.
103 Id.
104 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 164-65.
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from the Owings, regarding the burglary and disappearances." 5
Cobb denied any knowledge of, or involvement, in either the burglary
or the disappearances.0 6
In July 1994, Cobb was under arrest for an unrelated offense.0 7
At that time, the police questioned him again with respect to the inci-
dent at the Owings'." 8 Cobb then gave a written statement confess-
ing to the burglary but continued to deny any involvement in the dis-
appearance of Margaret and Kori Rae. 9 Cobb was subsequently
indicted for only the burglary charge."'
In August 1994, Hal Ridley was appointed to represent Cobb on
the burglary charge."' Following his appointment as Cobb's counsel,
investigators asked Ridley for permission to question Cobb regarding
the disappearances." 2 At that time, Cobb was not a suspect in the
murders, but the police believed he knew more than he was telling."3
Ridley gave his permission to the police and stated that it was not
necessary for him to be there."4 This situation occurred again in Sep-
tember 1995."' Throughout this entire time frame, Cobb continued
to deny any involvement in the disappearances." 6
In November 1995, Cobb was free on bond and living with his
father in Odessa, Texas." 7 On November 11, Charles Cobb, Ray-
mond's father, contacted the Walker County Sheriffs Office and
stated that his son had confessed to killing Margaret and Kori Rae
during the burglary." 8 Cobb's father gave a statement to that effect
to the police in Odessa, through which they obtained a warrant for
Cobb's arrest." 9 On November 12, the detectives arrested Cobb, read








113 Petitioner's Brief at 3 n.1, Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (No. 99-1702), avail-
able at 2000 WL 1236042.
114 Id. at3.
115 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 165.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.; Petitioner's Brief at 3, Cobb (No. 99-1702), available at 2000 WL 1236042.
19 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 165.
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him his Miranda rights and took him into custody. 2'
After taking Cobb into custody, the Odessa detectives received
permission from the Walker County Sheriffs Office to question
Cobb; the detectives were not aware at that point that he was repre-
sented by counsel on the burglary charge.'21 After Mirandizing Cobb
again, the detectives began to question him around 3 a.m. 2' Cobb
did not request counsel during this questioning nor indicate that he
was tired.'23 Shortly thereafter, Cobb confessed to murdering Marga-
ret and Kori Rae, both orally and in writing.124
After his confession, Cobb consented to a search of his home. 2 5
The officers did not find the murder weapon there, but did find nu-
merous other knives, newspaper articles about the disappearances,
Walt Disney videos alleged to be stolen from the Owings, and Mar-
garet's wedding band.'26 Around 9 a.m. that same morning, Cobb
was arraigned in Odessa on capital murder charges. 2  He was then
flown to Walker County and arraigned again in the airport there.' 28
After arriving in Walker County, Cobb led the police to the place
where the victims' bodies were buried.'29 Cobb was then taken to jail
and booked. 30 During that time, Cobb never indicated that he
wanted to speak with an attorney, nor that he was represented by an
attorney on the burglary charge."'
120 Id.; Petitioner's Brief at 4, Cobb (No. 99-1702), available at 2000 WL 1236042.
121 Petitioner's Brief at 4, Cobb (No. 99-1702), available at 2000 WL 1236042.
122 Id.
23 Id. at 4-5.
124 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 165; Petitioner's Brief at 4, Cobb (No. 99-1702) available at 2000
WL 1236042. In Cobb's confession, he stated that on the day in question he had been drink-
ing beer, tequila and smoking marijuana. While he was stealing the Owings' stereo, Marga-
ret confronted him and he stabbed her in the stomach. He then dragged her body to a
wooded area a few hundred yards from the house. After returning to the house, he found
Kori Rae asleep and took her outside to be with her mother. He then dug a hole between
them. After he had finished digging the hole, Kori Rae woke up and started crawling toward
her mother, falling in the hole as a result. Cobb then placed Margaret's body in the hole on
top of Kori Rae. After covering the bodies up, he stabbed a knife into the ground where he
had buried them. Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, Cobb (No. 99-1702), available at 2000 WL
1236042.




129 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 166; Petitioner's Brief at 5, Cobb (No. 99-1702), available at 2000
WL 1236042.




Later that evening, the Walker County District Attorney con-
tacted Ridley to tell him about Cobb's confession and capture. 3 2 Al-
though conflict in the record exists, either that same evening or the
next evening the investigators contacted Ridley and asked him if it
would be okay to take Cobb back to the murder site, to which Ridley
agreed. 33 On November 14, Ridley came to the jail to help Cobb
with emotional problems and shortly thereafter he was appointed as
Cobb's counsel on the murder charge.'34
V. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
During Cobb's lower court trial, he made a motion to suppress
his confession as being obtained in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment, which the trial court denied.'35 Cobb was subsequently con-
victed of capital murder for murdering more than one person in the
course of a single criminal transaction and sentenced to death.'36
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Cobb's convic-
tion and remanded for a new trial on the basis that the murder convic-
tion was "factually interwoven" with the burglary, and therefore the
right to counsel had attached when Cobb accepted Ridley as his
counsel on the burglary charge.'37 The court stated that "once the
right to counsel attaches to the offense charged, it also attaches to any
other offense that is very closely related factually to the offense
charged."'3 Since the murder was so interwoven with the burglary,
the right to counsel had attached to that crime as well, even though
Cobb had not yet been charged.'39 They also held that Cobb had as-
serted his right to counsel when he accepted Ridley as his counsel on
the burglary charge. 4 ° Therefore, the introduction of Cobb's confes-
sion during the trial was not harmless error.""
The dissent in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case, how-
ever, thought that Cobb was distinguishable from Michigan v. Jack-
132 Id. at 6.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 7.
135 Id.
136 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 166; Petitioner's Brief at 7, Cobb (No. 99-1702).
137 Cobb v. State, No. 72-807, 2000 WL 275644, at *1, *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 15,
2000).
138 Id. at *3.





son because Cobb had waived his right to counsel before confess-
ing."' They stated Cobb's waiver was valid, unlike the waiver in
Jackson, because it was given seventeen months after he was charged
with the first crime,'43 Cobb did not unequivocally invoke his right to
counsel,' and the State repeatedly received permission from Cobb's
attorney to question him.
45
The State sought certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court. 146 There were three issues in front of the Court on certiorari:
(1) whether the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel attached only to
charged offenses and not to uncharged, but "factually related" of-
fenses; (2) whether Cobb made a valid unilateral waiver of his right
to counsel in this case; and (3) what test was used to determine
whether an uncharged offense is the same as the charged offense. 47
Since the Court determined the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
had not attached to the uncharged 6ffenses, the Court did not consider
whether Cobb waived his right to counsel in this case. 148
V. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
The case was decided in the Supreme Court by a 5-4 decision.'49
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion 5 ° The Su-
preme Court, relying on McNeil v. Wisconsin, held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific, in that the right only
attaches to charged offenses and not to uncharged offenses that are
factually related to the charged offense."5 ' Moreover, it held that
when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, it encompasses
offenses that would be considered the same offense under the Block-
142 Id. at -10-*11.
143 Id. at *11 (interrogation in Jackson occurred shortly after the request for counsel, here
it occurred seventeen months later).
144 Id. The court said accepting counsel at an arraignment is not an unequivocal asser-
tion to the right to counsel. Id. at n. 11.
145 Id. at *I I (stating the interrogations over the seventeen month period amounted to a
waiver).
146 Texas v. Cobb, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000).
147 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167 (2001).
148 Id.
149 Id. at 163.
150 Id. (joining in the majority were O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
151 Id. at 164.
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burger test, even if those offenses have not been formally charged
yet.' 52
The Court held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-
specific and only attaches to a charged offense.'53 However, many
lower courts have read an exception into this rule that allows the right
to attach to crimes that are "factually related" to a charged offense.'54
Specifically in this case, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals used
this exception to say that Cobb's right to counsel for the murder at-
tached at the time of arraignment for the burglary. 5 This exception
has grown out of its implicit use in Brewer v. Williams and Maine v.
Moulton; however, the Court refused to rely on this because Brewer
and Moulton did not address the specific question.'56 in addition, the
Court pointed to a phrase in Moulton that refers to the offense-
specific nature of the right to counsel as supporting the public interest
in investigating crimes.'57 The Court in Moulton stated, "[tlo exclude
evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was ob-
tained, simply because other charges were pending at the time, would
unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the investigation of
criminal activities."'5 8 Thus, in order to promote the public interest,
the Court saw no reason to read an exception into the offense-
specific rule of the Sixth Amendment.'59
The Court rejected the argument raised by Cobb that the of-
fense-specific rule would invade a suspect's constitutional rights by
allowing police officers wide discretion to conduct investigations and
to use uncounseled interrogations in those investigations. 60 To sup-
port this position, the Court stated that the suspect must be informed
of his rights against compulsory self-incrimination and right to coun-
sel before a custodial interrogation.' 6' That was not an issue in this
152 Id. at 173.
153 Id. at 167-68.
154 Id. at 168; see, e.g., United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding state kidnapping charges and federal charges for transporting an illegal alien
were "inextricably intertwined").
155 Cobb v. State, No. 72-807, 2000 WL 275644, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2000).
156 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168-70.
157 Id. at 170-71.
158 Id. at 172 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 179-80 (1985)).
159 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 171-72.




case, since Cobb was Mirandized twice before confessing to police.'62
The Court also stated that even a suspect's Constitutional rights
do not negate the public interest in allowing police to talk to wit-
nesses and suspects, even if they have been charged with other of-
fenses. 6 ' The overriding public interest is "finding, convicting and
punishing those who violate the law," and the type of confession the
police obtained from Cobb is essential to promoting that interest.
164
After deciding that the Sixth Amendment right was indeed of-
fense-specific, the Court then turned to considering what would actu-
ally be considered the same offenses.'65 The Court realized that the
definition of offense is not necessarily limited to the "four comers of
a charging instrument."' 66 In doing so, the Court relied on the defini-
tion in Blockburger which described the same offense in terms of
double jeopardy.'67 The Court stated "where the same act or transac-
tion constitutes a violation of two or more distinct statutory provi-
sions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two of-
fenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not."' 68 The Court saw no reason why the defi-
nition of same offense in the context of double jeopardy was any dif-
ferent than the definition in Sixth Amendment right to counsel
cases.'69 Applying this reasoning to the facts in Cobb's case, the
Court determined that under the Texas Criminal Codes, murder and
burglary are not the same offense by definition, and therefore, Cobb's
confession was admissible. 7 '
B. CONCURRENCE
In a concurring opinion,'7' Justice Kennedy discussed the impor-
tance of not reaffirming or approving Michigan v. Jackson in the ma-
jority opinion, since the concurring justices believed Jackson was
162 Id.
163 Id. at 171-72.
164 Id. at 172.
165 Id. at 172-73.
166 Id. at 173.
167 Id. at 163.
168 Id. at 173 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
169 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 174 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas in his concurrence).
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questionable.'72 The justices believed that Edwards and Miranda
were sufficient to protect the accused's right to counsel. 73 According
to Edwards and Miranda, the accused must unambiguously assert
that he was invoking his right to counsel, and the concurrence states
the right should not apply unless the accused makes that assertion.'74
However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches independ-
ently of the accused's expressed request, regardless of any expressed
intent of the accused to remain silent." 5 The concurring Justices
found this rule questionable.'76
If Jackson applied in this situation, Cobb would not have been
allowed to voluntarily waive his right to counsel. 7 However, if
Jackson should only be applied where a suspect unambiguously as-
serts his right to counsel, as the concurring Justices believed, Jackson
did not apply in this case, since Cobb did not unambiguously assert
this right.'78 Therefore, the concurring Justices believed that Cobb
validly waived his right to counsel by voluntarily choosing to speak
to the police.'79
C. DISSENT
The four-member dissent was authored by Justice Breyer. 8 °
The dissent stated that the definition of same offense used by the ma-
jority was too technical and undermined the protections of the Sixth
Amendment.' 8' Although they felt that Cobb's charged and un-
charged offenses were sufficiently related to require the presence of
counsel at his confession,' the dissenting justices did not urge that
the right to counsel attaches to every crime the accused committed.'83
Instead, they urged that some limits must still be enforced.'84
172 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173 Id. at 174-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
'74 Id. at 175-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
175 Id. at 176 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176 ld. (Kennedy, J., concurring).177 Id. at 175-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178 Id. at 176 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179 Id. at 175-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
I80 Id. at 177 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined in his
dissent).
181 Id. at 178-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 187-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 178 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The dissenters believed that once a suspect asserts his need for
counsel, he should not be forced to make a critical legal choice with-
out the assistance of counsel.'85 By asserting the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, the suspect has shown that he "does not believe that
he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries single-
handedly."' 86 This would include being capable of choosing whether
to speak to prosecutors without an attorney present. 87 Although the
concurrence stated that Jackson does not allow for a defendant to
give his own account of the events that occurred, the dissent believed
that nothing stops the defendant from initiating contact with the po-
lice. '8 When the defendant is the one to initiate the contact with the
police, the protections of the Sixth Amendment can be waived.'89
The dissent also stated that due to the fact that criminal codes in
many states are extremely detailed, it is easy to find overlapping of-
fenses that may arise out of a single transaction, thus allowing the po-
lice to question the suspect on any number of the uncharged offenses
without notifying counsel. 9 ' The dissent used a simple hypothetical
to illustrate how an armed robbery, for instance, can result in at least
four different offenses. 19'
The dissent also noted that, although the majority relied on
Brewer and Moulton, if those cases had been decided after Cobb,
they would have had different outcomes.' 92 For example, in Moulton,
the defendant was charged with burglary and theft.' 93 If the Block-
burger test were to apply, those would be considered separate of-
fenses, and the conviction on the initial charged offense would have
been overturned. '9"
The dissent also stated that the Blockburger test is difficult to
administer in practice, yet the majority's decision now forces police
officers, as opposed to lawyers and judges, to apply this test before
185 Id. at 180 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Bladel, 365 N.W.2d 56, 67 (1984)).
187 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 181 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986).
190 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191 Id. (According to the majority, an armed robber who reaches across a store counter
and grabs a cashier while threatening the cashier's life could potentially be charged with the
separate offenses of "armed robbery, assault, battery, trespass, use of a firearm to commit a
felony and perhaps possession of a firearm by a felon.").
192 Id. at 183-84 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 167 (1985).
194 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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questioning suspects.' Therefore, the dissent urged an adoption of
the alternative that would define an offense in terms of the conduct of
a particular occasion and would include acts that are "closely related
to" or "inextricably intertwined with" the charged offense, using the
standards applied in the lower courts as a guideline.196
VI. ANALYSIS
In Cobb, the Court decided that the defendant's right to counsel
had not attached as to the uncharged murder.'97 Although this deci-
sion is well-supported by precedent,'98 the Court failed to recognize
the overall effect this will have on obliterating the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.'9 9 The Court opted to use a rule that purportedly in-
creased the ease of administration instead of a standard that ensured
fairness and the protection of the accused's rights."' 0 In addition, the
Court did not consider some issues that potentially could have im-
pacted their decision."0 ' These issues include the "circumventing the
Sixth Amendment" exception to the right to counsel and possible pro-
tections afforded by the no-contact ethics rule for attorneys.02
A. THE DECISION MADE IN COBB BLURS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO
COUNSEL AND DIMINISHES THE ADDED PROTECTIONS OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT.
Before considering the effect of the Cobb decision on Sixth
Amendment case law, it is necessary to examine the differences be-
tween the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment and under the'
Sixth Amendment. To begin, the purposes behind the rights differ.20 3
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right is to protect the accused
during confrontations with his "expert adversary," the government,
during the prosecution of the alleged crime, whereas the purpose of
195 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 186. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 174 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
198 See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285 (1988).
199 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 179, 183, 185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 185-87. The majority said this test is easier to use, but the dissent said a fact-
based inquiry was easier because it comports with common sense.
201 See infra Part VI. C.
202 Id.
203 McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178.
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the Fifth Amendment right is to protect the suspect's desire to deal
with police only through counsel.2" 4
The Fifth Amendment right to counsel was first established in
Miranda v. Arizona, where the Court held that suspects had the right
to counsel during custodial interrogations," 5 but the right could be
waived if the suspect "knowingly and intelligently waived his privi-
lege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel. 20 6 The right cannot be waived, though, if the police initiate
contact with the accused after he has requested counsel, since the
suspect's statements are then presumed to be involuntary and are in-
admissible.20 7 The most important distinction between the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel is that the Fifth Amendment right is not offense-specific; there-
fore once the suspect invokes this right, officers cannot approach him
regarding any offense without counsel present.20 8 The right was cre-
ated to "counteract the inherent pressures of custodial interactions.""2 9
In addition, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel does not attach
automatically, it requires some affirmative statement by the defen-
dant that can be construed as an expression of desire for counsel "in
dealing with custodial interrogation by the police."2 '
In contrast, the Sixth Amendment right is offense-specific.2 1' As
such, the right does not attach until the beginning of the adversary
proceedings, whether that be a formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment or arraignment.212 Therefore, when the accused makes in-
criminating statements with respect to crimes for which he has not
been formally charged, those statements are admissible at a trial of
those offenses.2"3 Once the right to counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment has been invoked, however, the right cannot be waived by the
accused during a police-initiated conversation.2 4
204 Id.
205 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
206 Id. at 475.
207 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1988).
208 Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (holding the Edwards rule applies even in
the context of a separate investigation).
209 Roberson, 486 U.S. at 685.
210 McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178 (emphasis in original).
211 Id. at 175.
212 Id. (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (citation omitted)).
213 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985).
214 McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175.
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In different respects, each right is somewhat broader and nar-
rower than the other.215 The Fifth Amendment right is narrower than
the Sixth Amendment right since it applies only in custodial interro-
gations, whereas the Sixth Amendment right applies at every stage of
the prosecution. 216 However, the Fifth Amendment right is broader in
the sense that it applies to questioning regarding any offense by the
accused without requiring the beginning of adversary proceedings.
2 17
The Sixth Amendment right only applies to crimes for which the de-
fendant has been charged. 21 8  Further, invoking one right does not
necessarily trigger the other right, since a suspect may be willing to
speak with police in the absence of counsel about crimes unrelated to
the charged offense.1 9
The decision in Cobb further limits the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel22 ° and places suspects and their attorneys in a precarious
position l.22  Following Cobb, suspects are no longer protected from
questioning regarding offenses which may have occurred at the same
time as a charged offense, but for which the suspects have not been
charged. Since many suspects are unsophisticated, they will likely
not realize the distinctions between the different rights to counsel.223
This places a heavy burden on the attorney to inform his client that he
must unequivocally reassert his Fifth Amendment right to counsel in
every discussion with the police, so that he will not be questioned re-
garding related offenses. 224 The defendant would not be allowed to
invoke his Sixth Amendment right with respect to other crimes, be-
cause those crimes have not been charged yet. 225





220 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
221 Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, The Right to Counsel After Cobb: Is There
Anything Left?, 165 N.J L.J. 33 (2001).
222 See generally Cobb, 532 U.S. at 162.
223 See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 221, at 33; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
463 (1938) ("that which is simple, orderly, and necessary to the lawyer-to the untrained
layman-may appear intricate, complex, and mysterious"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
69 (1932) (stating the defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him").
224 See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 221, at 33; Respondent's Brief at 9, Texas v.
Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (No. 99-1702).
225 Brief for Respondent at 10, Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (No. 99-1702).
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However, the protection of the Fifth Amendment assertion will
only protect the suspect in custodial interrogations.2 6 If the defen-
dant is approached in any other non-custodial setting without counsel
present regarding an uncharged offense, he will not have any protec-
tion under either the Sixth Amendment227 or the Fifth Amendment.228
There appear to be several reasons why the facts in Cobb were
more susceptible to a limitation of the Sixth Amendment. A long pe-
riod of time passed between the charging of the first crime and the
confession, making it less likely the suspect was in contact with
counsel regarding that offense. 29 Further, it was Cobb who initiated
the confession process by confessing to his father, and he did not un-
equivocally invoke his right to counsel.23 If he had remained silent
and was approached by the police for questioning regarding the mur-
der, the case may have turned out differently. However, in this case,
Cobb and his attorney had repeatedly waived his right to counsel dur-
ing questioning regarding the burglary and murder.' Lastly, murder
and burglary are very distinct offenses, especially under the Block-
burger test.232
However, the majority did not consider the ramifications of their
decision with respect to charged and uncharged offenses that are de-
scribed more similarly in the criminal codes.233 Since criminal codes
are very lengthy and detailed, there are now increased chances of
finding overlapping offenses arising out of one transaction.234  The
dissent presents several scenarios where conduct such as an armed
robbery, drug sale, or protest could produce several related of-
226 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991).
227 See id. at 175 (right does not attach until the beginning of criminal proceedings);
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (statements regarding uncharged crimes are
admissible at the trial of those offenses).
228 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Stating suspects have right to counsel
during custodial interrogations); McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178 (Stating Fifth Amendment right
arises only in custodial interrogations).
229 See Cobb v. State, No. 72, 807, 2000 WL 275644, at *10-11 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar.
15, 2000) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting).
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 174 (2001) (Burglary requires "entry into or con-
tinued concealment in a building," while capital murder requires "murder of more than one
person during a criminal transaction.").
233 See id. at 173-74 (applying the Blockburger rule to Cobb without discussion of why
this may be appropriate in Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases or cases with differing
facts).
234 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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fenses.235  This creates the unlimited potential for authorities to
charge a suspect with one aspect of the crime, such as assault, and
then conduct questioning of the suspect outside of counsel with re-
spect to a battery charge.236 Any information gained from the defen-
dant can then be used in a trial on the battery charge.237
The majority in Cobb downplays the impact that the decision
will have on the Constitutional rights of the suspects by stating that
no "parade of horribles," such as law enforcement officials with
unlimited ability to conduct interrogations without counsel present,
"has occurred in those jurisdictions that have not enlarged upon
McNeiL, 23 ' However, following the decision in Cobb, there is now
evidence that the police manipulation feared by the dissent is exactly
what is going to occur. 39 In July 2001, the FBI's Law Enforcement
Bulletin contained an article advocating "creative charging" by law
enforcement officials as a means of taking full advantage of the lim-
ited protections afforded to suspects under the Sixth Amendment.24 °
Such creative techniques would include charging the defendant with
one crime while continuing to investigate other related crimes and us-
ing a cellmate informant to question a suspect on uncharged of-
fenses.21 These are the identical tactics that the Cobb dissent warned
against as undermining the attorney-client relationship and removing
the protections of the Sixth Amendment.242
The Cobb decision is a strict departure from earlier case law rec-
ognizing the strong policy of protecting the rights of the accused.243
The Court had previously worried that the increased ability of police
officers to manipulate the Sixth Amendment would eviscerate the
235 See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). A drug sale could constitute posses-
sion of drugs, conspiring to sell drugs, being under the influence of drugs and possession of
drug paraphernalia, among other things. A protestor could potentially be charged with tres-
pass, failing to disperse and unlawful assembly. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing).
236 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Kimberly A. Crawford, The
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Application and Limitations, 70-7 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT
BULL. 27 (July 2001), available at 2001 WL 13957447.
237 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Crawford, supra note 236.
238 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 171.
239 See Crawford, supra note 236.
240 Id. at 31.
241 Id.
242 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 181 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
243 See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (stating average criminals do
not have professional legal skills to protect themselves, and right to counsel is necessary for
the fair administration ofjustice system).
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right to counsel.244 The Court had also stated that all doubts regard-
ing waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be re-
solved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim.245 However,
the decision in Cobb places the interests of the police in investigating
crimes above the interests of the accused.246 Allowing this situation
to occur exploits the vulnerability of the defendant,247 who does not
have the requisite legal skills to protect himself.248 It also overrides
the purpose behind the Sixth Amendment to "protect the unaided lay-
man at critical confrontations" with his "expert adversary, ' '249 since
now the defendant can be questioned during those "critical con-
frontations" without counsel present. 250 Finally, the majority's deci-
sion will decrease the effectiveness of a lawyer's role as a "medium"
between the suspect and the government 251 by removing the buffer of
an attorney in questioning regarding uncharged offenses.5 2
B. THE COURT GIVES NO JUSTIFICATION FOR APPLYING
BLOCKBURGER IN SIXTH AMENDMENT CASES, EVEN THOUGH
THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT LOWER COURTS WERE UNABLE
TO APPLY THE "FACTUALLY RELATED" EXCEPTION.
As discussed in many lower court cases,2 3 there has been an ex-
ception to the offense-specific nature of the Sixth Amendment for
"factually related" or "inextricably intertwined" offenses.254 In these
situations, the government may not question a suspect regarding
244 See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180.
245 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986).
246 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 172.
247 See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 221, at 33.
248 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
249 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991).
250 See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 221, at 33.
251 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 178 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159, 176 (1985)). See also McNeil, 501 U.S. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]oday's de-
cision is ominous because it reflects a preference for an inquisitorial system that regards the
defense lawyer as an impediment rather than a servant to the cause of justice.").
252 See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 221, at 33.
253 See, e.g. United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37 (3d Cir.
1997); United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Williams,
993 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1993); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218 (Mass. 1997);
In re Pack, 616 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
254 See, e.g., Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223 (suppressing statements related to the federal
charge of transporting illegal immigrants when the defendants had only been charged by the
state with kidnapping, because the offenses were "inextricably intertwined").
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crimes that are closely related to the charged crime, without the pres-
ence of counsel.255 If a suspect is questioned regarding these crimes
and subsequently confesses, those confessions are inadmissible at
trial. 56
In determining whether offenses are closely related, the courts
consider all the facts and circumstances related to the offenses.257
This includes the place, time and people involved in the crimes, as
well as the motive behind the crime; however, none of these factors
are dispositive."' In addition, crimes have been found to be unre-
lated where the acts were separated by time, location or other circum-
stances .2" For example, in Commonwealth v. Rainwater, the defen-
dant was charged with a theft that occurred on September 10,
however, after his arraignment he was questioned and confessed to
thefts that had taken place earlier in the year.26 The court found that
even though the same three people were involved in all the crimes,
the offenses were not "inextricably intertwined," since they occurred
at different times.2 6'
This fact-based inquiry has been applied in many cases, and the
courts that have applied it show no difficulty in doing so.2 62 In addi-
tion, this "closely related" test furthers the policies behind the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by allowing the defendant a fair trial.
The Cobb dissent realizes that this test is not perfect, however, the
application is rooted in common sense, which they assert makes it
easier to apply. 264 Instead of adopting this test, however, the major-
ity, in essence, abolished the exception by applying the factors of the
Blockburger test instead.
The Blockburger test arose in context of double jeopardy and has
never been applied in the right to counsel cases.6 The Cobb major-
ity did not elaborate on their reasons for deciding to apply Block-
255 Id.
256 Id. at 1226.
257 Id. at 1225.
258 Id.
259 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218 (Mass. 1997).
260 Id. at 1220.
261 Id. at 1224. See also United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 457 (5th Cir. 1993)
("These charges brought by different sovereigns and concerning different conduct are not
'extremely closely related."').
262 See, e.g., Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d at 1223-25.
263 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 187 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
264 Id. at 186-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
265 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 172-73.
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burger to the Sixth Amendment cases.266 In other cases, even Chief
Justice Rehnquist has stated the test should not be applied where
there is contrary legislative intent. 67 Although there is no strict legis-
lative intent not to apply the Blockburger test to the right to counsel
cases, there is already an established line of cases applying the
"closely related" test.268
Chief Justice Rehnquist has also elaborated on the purposes be-
hind the Double Jeopardy clause,2 69 but those purposes differ signifi-
cantly from the purposes behind the right to counsel. The primary
purposes behind the Double Jeopardy clause are to "protect against a
second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal ... after a
conviction.., and against multiple punishments for the same of-
fense."27 However, the purpose behind the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is to protect the defendant in confrontations with his ad-
versary during the criminal prosecution.27'
While the purposes of the Double Jeopardy clause turn on the
definition of "same offense," '272 the purpose behind the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not mention the same offense.273
Throughout legal discussions, it has been pointed out that "the ten-
dency to assume that a word which appears in two or more rules, and
so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have
precisely the same scope in all of them ... has all the tenacity of
original sin and should be guarded against. '274 The Supreme Court in
Cobb did not "guard against" this fallacy when deciding to apply
Blockburger to the Sixth Amendment context without addressing the
differing purposes behind the right to counsel and double jeopardy.
The Blockburger test is also not as simple to administer as the
majority seems to believe.275 Even the Supreme Court has differed on
266 Id.
267 United States v. Albernaz, 450 U.S. 333, 340-42 (1981); see also Whalen v. U.S.,
445 U.S. 684, 708 n.3 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he dispositive question is
whether the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments, and the Blockburger test
should be employed only to the extent that it advances that inquiry.").
268 See, e.g., United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999).
269 Whalen, 445 U.S. at 700 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
270 Id.
271 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991).
272 Whalen, 445 U.S. at 700 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
273 McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178.
274 WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
159(1949).
275 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the correct application. 276 For example, in United States v. Dixon, the
Court was fractured on whether the test applied to the statutory ele-
ments of the charged offenses or whether it applied to the particular
facts of each case. 277 In addition, the author of the majority opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, has described the Blockburger test in the
double jeopardy context as a "veritable Sargasso Sea which could not
fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator. 2 '78 As the dis-
sent realizes, however, now police officers and investigators will be
asked to apply this test to each particular case, instead of having legal
professionals decide.279  This situation creates the possibility of in-
creased litigation regarding this issue.
The Supreme Court's decision is additionally puzzling due to the
fact that two of the foundational cases would likely have turned out
differently if decided after Cobb.28 In crafting the "inextricably in-
terwoven" exception, the lower courts relied on the implicit use of
this exception in Brewer v. Williams and Maine v. Moulton.282
In Moulton, the defendant was first charged with theft, then
made incriminating statements, and was then charged with bur-
glary.283 The Court affirmed the decision of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine, which had remanded the case for a new trial on both
counts because the incriminating statements were allowed at trial.284
However, under the Maine statutes, the crimes of burglary and theft
each required proof of different facts. 285 Therefore, if Cobb had al-
ready been decided, only Moulton's theft conviction would have been
overturned, as that was the only offense charged at the time of the
276 See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993); Whalen, 445 U.S. at 684.
277 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 716-17 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The
majority in Dixon was only joined in four out of five parts. Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun,
Souter, and White all wrote separate opinions concurring and dissenting in part.
278 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
279 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
280 Id. at 185-86.
281 Id. at 184.
282 United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999).
283 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 162-67 (1985).
284 Moulton, 474 U.S. at 167-68.
285 Compare Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 17-A § 353(1) (1983) ("A person is guilty of theft if he
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with intent to deprive
him thereof."), with Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 17-A § 401 (1983) ("A person is guilty of burglary
if he enters or surreptitiously remains in a structure ...."). To be guilty of burglary the per-




Likewise, Brewer v. Williams contained a situation that likely
would have turned out differently if decided after Cobb.287 At the
time of his confession to a murder, Williams had only been charged
with abduction.288 However, the Federal District Court stated that
Williams was entitled to a new trial on the murder charge, which the
United States Supreme Court upheld.289 This decision illustrates that
the Supreme Court assumed that the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel extended to those related charges. 29' At the very least, the major-
ity in Cobb should have addressed the fact that the reasoning in those
cases was inconsistent with their reasoning in Cobb, instead of
merely asserting that the cases did not address the precise issue. 29'
C. THE COURT NEGLECTED TO CONSIDER SEVERAL ISSUES RAISED IN
LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS AND PRIOR CASE LAW, INCLUDING
THE EXCEPTION FOR CIRCUMVENTING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.
Although the Court considered the "inextricably intertwined"
exception to the offense-specific nature of the right to counsel, the
Court has not yet had the opportunity to consider the "circumventing
the Sixth Amendment" exception.292 This exception applies when
"the government breach[es] its 'affirmative obligation not to act in a
manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded
by the right to counsel." 293 Since many lower courts ended up apply-
ing the "inextricably intertwined" exception, they have not had as
much opportunity to apply the "circumventing the Sixth Amendment
exception., 294 However, since the "inextricably intertwined" excep-
tion no longer exists after Cobb, it is possible that courts may still
rely on the "circumventing the Sixth Amendment" exception.
If lower courts and the Supreme Court decide to apply this ex-
ception in the future, the types of situations the dissent warns against,
such as charging a suspect with only one offense, but questioning him
286 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 184 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
287 Id.; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
288 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 391-94.
289 Id. at 389-90.
290 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 184 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
291 Id. at 162, 168.
292 Id. at 184.
293 United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Maine v. Moulton,
474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985)).
294 See, e.g., United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1999).
[Vol. 93
TEXAS v. COBB
regarding related ones, can be avoided." 5 Although it is not nearly as
protective of the accused's rights as the "inextricably intertwined"
exception, it may keep the Sixth Amendment right to counsel from
being eviscerated, because it will apply in situations where the police
officers are specifically trying to avoid dealing with the suspect
through counsel.296 For example, the encouragement of the FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin to use "creative charging" to circumvent the
limited protections of the amendment could be considered one such
prohibited situation.297
Further protection for the accused may be afforded by the no-
contact ethics rule.29 As provided by Rule 4.2 of the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "in representing
a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the rep-
resentation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by an-
other lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. 2 99
Although this rule is examined for potential applicability in Mas-
siah, the Court determined that it only applies to attorneys and not
investigators and therefore should not be applied in this context. 0
The main protection afforded by the no-contact rule is to protect the
litigant from having to deal with the legal skill and knowledge of the
opposing lawyer.31 That purpose is not served when the person do-
ing the questioning is a police officer with no legal skill. 2
The dissent in Patterson states that the same notions of fairness
apply in the criminal context that apply in the civil context, but the
dissent does not address the fact that investigators will be conducting
the questioning. 33 Any "private interview" conducted by the prose-
cutor or his or her agents would be unethical. 304 Further, prosecutors
are not ethically allowed to give advice to the accused. 3 5 This posi-
295 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
296 Hines, 963 F.2d at 258.
297 See Crawford, supra note 236, at 31.
298 Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 221, at 35.
299 Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1984)
300 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 210-11 (1964).
301 Id.
302 See id.
303 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
304 Id.
305 Id. at 308-09.
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tion is strengthened by the recent passage of the "McDade Bill,"30 6
which imposes the same ethical rules on prosecutors that it does on
any other attorney. 7 However, the Court that addressed this issue
realized that often the contact between a prosecutor and a suspect will
be "authorized by law."3 8 Only in severe cases will the prosecutor
violate the no-contact rule.30 9
In one sense, this protection is even broader than the Sixth
Amendment because it applies prior to indictment.3"' However, the
ethical rules are not applicable to the officers who conduct investiga-
tions, such as in Cobb. Therefore, the protections afforded to the ac-
cused are not great enough to ensure the continued protection of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel for all suspects.
VII. CONCLUSION
In determining that the right to counsel is offense-specific and
that there is no exception for "factually related" offenses, the Su-
preme Court continued its trend of contracting the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.311 Since suspects do not need to be represented by
counsel with respect to closely related crimes, there is now ample op-
portunity for police officers to manipulate the charges brought
against suspects in order to gain evidence admissible at trial.312 In
fact, this method has already been advocated in at least one con-
text.313
Further, the litigation on this issue will likely continue as police
officers are now forced to apply the Blockburger test in determining
which offenses can be considered the same offense.3 14 The majority
did not discuss why this test is applicable in the right to counsel con-
text, and previous litigation has indicated that this test is not as sim-
ple as the majority would indicate."' In contrast, applying the
306 Ethical Standards for Attorneys for the Government, 28 U.S.C. § 350B (2002).
307 Id.; Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 221, at 35.
308 Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 221, at 35 (citing United States v. Hammad, 858
F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1998)).
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
312 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 182-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
313 Crawford, supra note 236.
314 Cobb, 532 U.S. at 185-86 (Breyer, J., dissenting).




"closely related" exception did not seem to pose major problems in
the lower courts. 16 However, the impact of this new test remains to
be seen.
Although there are indications that suspects may be protected by
the "circumventing the Sixth Amendment" exception and the no-
contact rule, there has not been much opportunity to apply these rules
up until now, and their impact is doubtful. Attorneys will have to
strongly urge their clients to invoke their Fifth Amendment right dur-
ing every contact with law enforcement, and suspects will need to
rely on their own unsophisticated knowledge and experience." 7 The
protections inherent in the prior Sixth Amendment right to counsel
cases simply are not as effective as they once were.
Melissa Minas
316 See, e.g., United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999).
317 See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 221, at 34.
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